OIL DEPENDENCY AND THE PERUVIAN AMAZON

How Oil Companies Have Exploited the Rainforest of Loreto

With testimonies of the Kichwa people from the Tigre River
The department of Loreto, located in north-east Peru, contains by far the largest section of the Peruvian Amazon. Loreto represents 55% of Peru’s forested area, hosts Peru’s biggest national reserve and is immensely rich in flora and fauna. It is also home to an estimated 27 different indigenous peoples, more than any other region of Peru. Together, they represent 32% of Loreto’s population.

For more than four decades oil development has caused destruction in this precious part of the Amazon. In an oil concession called Lot 1AB, about 500,000 hectares of forest have been explored and exploited for the last 40-plus years. The effect has been so devastating that in 2013 and 2014 a state of environmental and sanitary emergency was declared in four river basins in Loreto, some of the Amazon’s main tributaries, by the Peruvian government.

Although the contract in Lot 1AB expires on August 29 this year, a new, larger concession called Lot 192 has been established in that same area. Given the current estimated reserves, this implies that another 30 years of oil operations lie ahead.

“The return to thriving ecosystems will likely take more than 30 years, and must include stopping new spills from happening from corroded and improperly installed pipelines,” says Ricardo Segovia, environmental engineer at E-Tech.

For the last 15 years the main actor in Lot 1AB has been Pluspetrol. The company started operating in Peru in 1996 and took over oil block 1AB in 2000. Since 2003 the subsidiary company operating the concession has been Pluspetrol Norte S.A., 45% of which is owned by the Chinese national oil company China National Petroleum Corporation.
**CONTAMINATION AND DANGEROUS HEALTH IMPACTS**

The environmental impacts of oil production in Lot 1AB.

A state of emergency has been declared in the basins of major Amazon tributaries, there are at least 92 contaminated sites with no clear guarantees that they will be cleaned up, and up until 2009 the polluted production waters were dumped directly into the rivers (the equivalent of 1.1 million barrels of production waters containing crude oil a day). In addition, hundreds of kilometres of time-worn, improperly installed pipelines are corroded and leaking, and entire ecosystems, such as Lake Shanshococha, have been completely destroyed.

According to Marti Orta, investigator at the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona: “The contamination of surface waters due to the removal of oil was reduced in this region by 2008, by the start of the reinjection of the formation waters, but there is a great ignorance of the contamination present in sediment, soil, and the possible bioaccumulation of heavy metals in animals that the local indigenous people fish and hunt for food. This ignorance, linked to the increased demand for fossil fuels, generates great concerns about the consequences that the extension of boundaries for new projects of exploitation and extraction could have.”

A Peruvian Congress commission report found that the contamination has affected local nutrition and the capacity of people to feed themselves – not only to thrive, but simply to survive. Crops are dying and fruits are growing at a reduced size compared to 40 years ago, before the contamination took effect.

The impact on local people’s health and sanitation has been devastating. For decades people have been falling ill and dying, while little has ever been done to recognize or redress these losses.

Jose Alvarez Alonso, a biologist in the Ministry of Environment who used to work in the Tigre River basin, has written that the death of 20 children in just two years in one Kichwa community, Vista Alegre, appears to have been caused by Lot 1AB: “Subsequent studies by specialists, following a series of denouncements by indigenous leaders from the Tigre basin in an article in the Medio Ambiente de Lima magazine, showed that contamination of the water and – consequently – the fish, which store the heavy metals in their tissue, was the likeliest cause of the massacre.”

In very recent tests, high levels of toxic metals were found in the bodies of animals near the 1AB site.

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"Before, when there wasn’t any pollution, we used to harvest nice bunches of bananas; now you only see these tiny bananas, growing in small bunches.

Bella, 27"

"Before, we could stuff ourselves with papayas; now our papayas are all dying. They are just like human beings, too. Everything is just drying out.

Lindadora, 49"

"There’s no food left for us, the way there used to be. The soil doesn’t produce the way it used to: it still produces all right, but the pineapples, coconas and yuccas are small. The fish are tiny as well, and they taste foul. Inside they are ill as well.

Noemi, 46"

"The way they were screaming when they were dying! They all vomited blood. In less than two years, 27 people have died here. Three of my own children have died. Our tears have dried up by now.

Noemi, 46"

"Jose Alvarez Alonso, a biologist in the Ministry of Environment who used to work in the Tigre River basin, has written that the death of 20 children in just two years in one Kichwa community, Vista Alegre, appears to have been caused by Lot 1AB: “Subsequent studies by specialists, following a series of denouncements by indigenous leaders from the Tigre basin in an article in the Medio Ambiente de Lima magazine, showed that contamination of the water and – consequently – the fish, which store the heavy metals in their tissue, was the likeliest cause of the massacre.”"
The establishment of Lot 192 in the very same area as Lot 1AB has been severely criticized by two United Nations Special Rapporteurs: Vicky Tauli-Corpuz (Indigenous Rights) and Baskut Tuncak (Human Rights and Toxics).

In December 2014, they stated that: “The proposed re-licensing of heavily polluted land in the Department of Loreto, Peru, would perpetuate and exacerbate serious violations of human rights of indigenous peoples, including their right to health, food and water.”

The indigenous communities in the impacted region have shown great capacity to organize themselves and to negotiate. Through dialogue and peaceful protests, they have been demanding land titling, remedi-ation of contaminated areas, compensation for land use, and reparation for the damages caused. In 2014 and early 2015, the government and indigenous organizations sat around the table in a “Multisectoral Commission”, partly paid for by the United Nations, to attend to their demands. At the same time, several community protests demanded real change and reparation before Pluspetrol’s withdrawal – and before the granting of a new licence to operate in Lot 192. The fear of repeating the same scenario from 2000 when Occidental Petroleum left is very present in the people’s memory.

On March 10th 2015, an agreement was struck between the government and two of the indigenous organizations representing communities in oil block 1AB. It ignored crucial issues such as guarantees regarding land titling, compensation for the use of territories, and reparations for damages caused. Three months later, the same organizations that had signed the agreement sued the state, demanding that their rights to land titling, compensation and reparations be respected.

State agencies often consider peaceful civil protests “social conflicts”. As Perupetro, the state company responsible for signing oil licences, has stated: “The social and environmental impacts of block 1AB have caused a diverse range of social conflicts.” Indeed, 6 out of 10 conflicts registered in April 2015 by the state ombudsman, la Defensoria del Pueblo, involved Pluspetrol.

**Timeline of Social Conflict**

**2014 - JUNE**
Mobilization by Quechua of Pastaza. The Quechus were told that solutions would be found by the Multisectoral Commission.

**2014 - NOVEMBER**

**2015 - JANUARY - FEBRUARY**
Kichwa people block the River Tigre. Demands: prior consultation process, compensation and reparation.

**2015 - FEBRUARY**
Blocking of oil wells by the Achuar communities of Pampahermosa and Jerusalem. Demands: reparation for damages caused.
WHO ARE PLUSPETROL?

Pluspetrol Resources Corporation is the parent company of 38 subsidiary companies, one of which is Pluspetrol Norte S.A. It was founded in 1976 by an Argentinean family and the current CEO is Texan oil tycoon, Steve Crowell.

The company’s extractive operations extend across Latin America – with oil and gas operations in Colombia, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela and Bolivia, plus exploratory activities in Angola, Africa. Since 1995, Pluspetrol Resources Corporation has been registered in the notorious tax haven of the Cayman Islands. And it is still registered there today.

In December 2000, Pluspetrol Resources Corporation established its head office in Amsterdam and became a holding company in the Netherlands. A 2013 report by legal experts SOMO states that “given the lack of substance of the Dutch office, the motivation for this move is most likely the beneficial Dutch fiscal climate and investment protection.”

Pluspetrol took over operations in Lot 1AB from USA-based Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy) in 2000 and has since contracted smaller companies, such as TEPSI, CORPESA and SKANSKA, Burling, SODEXO, Erlander and PETREX, amongst many others, as well as community-run companies (set up since 2006), to carry out many of their practical operations in the oil block.

Pluspetrol’s policy has always been to claim that they are not responsible for anything. The subcontractors are responsible for everything. And the subcontractor says that Pluspetrol are responsible. So who is responsible in the end?

The Silent Partner: the Chinese

Since 2003, Pluspetrol has created a “strategic alliance” with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) through the sale of 45% of Pluspetrol Norte. CNPC is one of the world’s largest oil companies and currently has about 130 subsidiaries operating in 29 countries throughout the globe. China National Petroleum Corporation is China’s largest oil and gas producer and supplier with RMB 2 trillion in total assets (US$ 316.7 billion) and RMB 1 trillion (US$ 158.3 billion) in revenues in 2010. CNPC ranked fifth in Petroleum Intelligence Weekly’s list of the world’s top 50 oil companies in 2010, based on oil reserves, oil production, natural gas reserves, natural gas output, refinery capacity, and product sales volumes.

The company was also in the top 10 of Fortune Magazine’s 2011 Global 500 in terms of sales revenue, up from 46th in 2005.

Historically, the majority of CNPC’s oil supply has been from Chinese deposits, accounting for roughly 60 percent of China’s total domestic production. However, domestic oil production is flattening out, and company experts estimate that China’s proven reserves will dry up within the next 10-15 years. As CNPC’s global portfolio rapidly grows, it is facing an increasing number of political, social and environmental risks that are typical for international oil majors. However, despite the company’s size and reach, it does not have adequate environmental and social governance systems to effectively address these risks. Furthermore, CNPC doesn’t have the best track record in human rights issues.

For many years CNPC has been a silent, and effectively invisible, partner. But then, in a national Peruvian publicity campaign in June 2015, just two months before the contract for Lot 1AB was due to expire, the company stepped out of the shadows and said, together with Pluspetrol, that it is a ‘Guardian of Biodiversity’ and cares deeply for the environment and the indigenous communities in the Amazon.
Not Taking Responsibility

Pluspetrol say that “care for the environment” is one of their top priorities. When Pluspetrol took over Lot 1AB in 2000 they agreed to assume all the environmental and social responsibilities of their predecessor, Oxy. However, Pluspetrol’s behaviour tells a different story: that of a company using myriad tactics to evade their responsibilities.

Malpractice, Challenging Sanctions and Fines

Until 2009 Pluspetrol dumped its polluted production waste waters directly into the rivers. Only after large-scale protests by the indigenous communities in the area did it begin a process to reinject waste water deep into the ground. The company boasts of having invested half a billion US dollars in reinjection, but in 2012 its reinjection program was already found to be failing by OSINERGMIN.

Several multimillion-dollar fines have been imposed on Pluspetrol for environmental damages caused, but the company has appealed almost all of them.

The environmental monitors of the indigenous organizations are the first ones to register the inadequate remediation efforts.

In addition, several state bodies have questioned Pluspetrol’s clean-up efforts. In October 2014, in the two years since the Peruvian government declared a state of environmental emergency for the area, the government agency for environmental assessment and enforcement (OEFA) issued a report on the environmental situation in Lot 1AB, concluding – among many other observations – that at least 92 heavily contaminated sites are Pluspetrol’s responsibility, along with at least seven out of 75 contaminated sites, registered from the start of Pluspetrol’s operations.

Pluspetrol asked for OEFA’s report to be effectively annulled. At first, a local judge in Loreto conceded provisional measures in favor of the company, but later this was reversed.

While supervising the area, OEFA saw that Pluspetrol doesn’t have the necessary equipment to be able to handle an oil spill. Why? Well, because in the first place, their pipelines are extremely corroded. That was OEFA’s first remark: that the pipelines aren’t fit to be operative anymore. That’s why the very first thing the new company should do is to change the pipelines. There’s one oil spill after the other, it never stops. These pipelines are corroded and worn out. How could you say that Pluspetrol is capable of controlling the contamination, when you see this happening? Or maybe they just don’t invest, they’re not capable of investing.

The refinery was in Marsella. That’s where “La Plus” was remediating. The remediation dated from 2012-2013, but when we started digging and digging, the oil appeared, because there was an oil spill at the refinery, which caused a huge impact. When the company noticed that the crude kept on coming, they covered it up, mixed it with earth, and the pollution stayed below. In 2015 we entered the area with OEFA. That’s when we noticed that the company did nothing to remediate, they just covered up, in an attempt to hide things. The same is happening on several sites. And things aren’t getting any better. In 2015 we were back with OEFA and we discovered that the area is even worse, because oil is pouring out everywhere, with the rain and all that. And what does “La Plus” say? The area is clean.

What do they do to cover up an oil spill? They deforest another virgin area, they bring the soil back from over there, and they cover it up. And on top of that, they plant new trees, and sow plants. But three months later everything dies off. And when none of the plants is left to protect the soil, the oil reappears. So it’s back to square one. But in the meantime they did deforest another area.

Pluspetrol has tried to buy off indigenous environmental monitors, telling them: “What if you come and work for me? I’ll pay you well, you show me your reports, and you report back to your federation, saying that I’m remediating.”

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One of best examples of how Pluspetrol handles its responsibility is the now infamous case of Shanshococha (Resolución Directorial N° 534-2013-OEFA/DFSAl, 22th of November 2013.) In 2012, environmental monitors reported high levels of contamination in and around Lake Shanshococha – a lake located in the Pastaza basin. Although the lake is accessible and a well-known fishing spot for local communities, the company argued that the contamination was part of the mess left by Oxy in 2000. Pluspetrol was found responsible for destroying an entire ecosystem and was ordered to pay a multimillion-dollar sanction and clean up the area.

The Abandonment Plan

Given the August 2015 expiry date of Pluspetrol’s contract, OEFA requested in 2014 that the company urgently submit its abandonment plan. They did not do so until late January 2015. The submitted plan was incomplete and inadequate.

The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM), together with other state bodies, made about 200 “observations”. These included the company’s responsibility for the 92 contaminated sites documented by OEFA, the obligation to apply new standards for soil remediation, and the request for more information on the reinjection program and on the 200 or so wells that are in use and have been in use.

There are also tons of scrap metal that they have buried. We know for sure. They have never been removed.

In its response to MINEM’s approximately 200 “observations”, Pluspetrol argued that it was only responsible for the closing and cleaning up of 17 oil wells and 13 garbage deposits, as this was not considered a shutdown of oil production. Since production would be continued, the company argued, there was no need to clean up installations and areas that would still be used. The plan has not been approved yet.
**Pluspetrol’s “Social Contribution”**

Pluspetrol says it works together with local communities, to "improve their quality of life". The company says on its website that one of its main objectives is to "operate in harmony with local communities, in a partnership of mutual benefit... in order to support their development."

In 2005, Pluspetrol established a community relations program to ensure that its social objectives were better accomplished. The company lists some of these: installing electricity and water treatment systems, building schools and education centres, donating boat motors and gasoline, and providing health services such as evacuations and free emergency care to the most vulnerable people.

However, studies on the social conditions of communities living in and around Lot 1AB found disturbing results. An analysis by social anthropologist Frederica Barclay, which was later used in a report by a Peruvian Congress Commission, found that 6 out of 10 people are still living in extreme poverty in two of the main districts in Lot 1AB. Numerous testimonies from people living in the communities that suffer the impacts from Lot 1AB make it clear how Pluspetrol has not met its social commitments. They share many stories of humiliation and discrimination and say that the company has worked its way into every aspect of daily life and deliberately created local people's dependence on it. Some say they got really angry when they saw Pluspetrol’s recent publicity campaign.

"We, the indigenous people, are marginalized by the outsiders, despite the fact that they are taking oil from our territories. We belong to the lowest category. I mean, we are pawns.

"They were going to give us livestock, with everything, they said, to make some money. But they were fooling us. They do this to us because we are natives, so they say. They have installed a water tank, with a water pool, which is completely useless. Why do they come and do all these bad things to us, when they have all this money?"

"Once there was a letter against me. I used to be a teacher and was born there, and I had called for a meeting in the community in order for us to improve the agreement proposed by “la Plus”. Afterwards we went on strike, and they didn’t like that. So they took me away. They are in control.

"There are several agreements. But they never listened to what the people wanted. For example, we asked for electricity or sidewalks. But what they accepted in my community was to give us school kits. How much money are they making on our lands? And what they were giving us were school kits? Really?"

"They have become millionaires thanks to our lands, and they have poisoned our waters. They have killed my children. Do you think they have ever paid anything to me? And they tell me: “Seeing there are so few of you, we won’t help you.”"
There are many agreements we’ve signed with them, that haven’t been kept by Pluspetrol. For example, we signed an agreement for the donation of fuel, that hasn’t been kept up to now. Or to give us school kits every year, they don’t do that either. We asked for electricity for our community. They threw the materials on the ground, and they are still there. It’s hazardous for our children.

Orlando, 39

In San Jacinto (the Tigre River), the medical team attend whenever they feel like it. And they tell you: “Here come these Indians again. I bet you they will annoy us again. They’ll ask for milk. Seeing that they have never had milk, they want us to give them some.” I have heard that kind of remark several times. I felt that they were humiliating me. I was ashamed to go there, but you see your child who is ill, and you have no other choice. But now there’s hardly any service. They don’t attend to you. They say that the communities are rising against “Plus”.

Bella, 27

Pluspetrol said that if they leave, there won’t be any company that will want to work with the communities. These are the lies they are telling, and some communities believe them. That’s how they create conflicts amongst the communities.

Joel, 28

They attend to your needs. But they give you paracetamol. Two small pills. That doesn’t cure you.

Flora, 64

I’ve seen a publicity campaign saying that Pluspetrol is working hand in hand with the communities, that they protect the environment, our health, our children. It makes me feel ashamed for them to see this advertising they aren’t living up to. They don’t care. What’s more, they won’t admit all the bad things they have done. The people who don’t live here might believe the campaign, but the people from the communities don’t believe it, because they live here.

Bella, 27
Weak Governance and Prosecution of Indigenous Leaders

Pluspetrol itself has stated that weak governance is an issue in oil block 1AB and the Loreto region. This weakness has proven advantageous to the company. Pluspetrol was allowed to use the territory in Lot 1AB without paying compensation for land use to the indigenous peoples, who consider it their land.

Pluspetrol refused to join the Multisectoral Commission that met in 2014 and early 2015, which was established to encourage dialogue between the company, the government and the indigenous peoples in the Lot 1AB region. In the agreement, signed with some of the indigenous organizations on March 10th, 2015, the state agreed to invest 50 million Peruvian soles (approximately $US15,730,000) to contribute to cleaning up the area. It is a first and very small contribution, as Perupetro's representative Luis Ortega stated: "The clean-up of lot 1AB will cost about $US90 million." It's unclear whether the state will be able to make the responsible polluter eventually pay for it.

The state together with Pluspetrol are trying to marginalize people who stand up for their rights. Currently over 20 Kichwa leaders from the Pastaza and Tigre River are accused of crimes such as extortion, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery, after they asked for compensation for years of free land use and reparation for the severe damages caused, through peaceful protest and demonstration. In early July 2015, the arrest warrant following this accusation was declared invalid by a judge in Nauta.

After visiting Lot 1AB in 2014, UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Rights, James Anaya, identified this problem in his report, noting that the existing "criminal prosecution" abuses "indigenous people who have participated in the protests against extractive activities and those who have been accused of crimes such as extortion, disruption of public order, incitement to rebellion and destruction of property."

A new law has now set a disconcerting precedent for police use of force. "Worryingly, a new law was published in January 2014, which amends the Penal Code, to exempt responsibility from the staff of the armed forces and the police that "in the line of duty and through the use of their weapons or other means of defense, cause injury or death."

Case Study

In 2008, when people living in or affected by Lot 1AB held protests against Pluspetrol – one of which was the peaceful occupation of Pluspetrol’s runway airport in Andoas – over 50 people were arrested and charged with aggravated trespassing. While being held against their will on Pluspetrol property, they were beaten and tortured (see testimonies in Peruvian court in the Andoas case, as shown in the documentary "Law of the Jungle"). Following a long court case in 2009, they were found innocent and the judge made clear that social conflicts should not be resolved in court. No investigation has ever been made into the allegations of torture.
Peru’s Most Prolific Oil Block Fails to Improve Quality of Life for Inhabitants of Loreto

Lot 1AB is the most prolific oil concession in Peru’s history, currently producing approximately 17% of the country’s entire oil output and an average of 12,242 barrels of crude per day. Current reserves are estimated at over 138 million barrels, which means there will be at least another 30 years of oil production.

In monetary terms, the figures are astounding. In 10 years of oil production (from 2004 to 2014), Lot 1AB generated $US1,678.22 million for the Peruvian state in royalties. In 2014 alone, $US709,535,076.33 ($2,251 million Peruvian Soles) worth of oil was extracted from Loreto. The Peruvian state received $US186,603,627.36 ($592 million Peruvian Soles) and since 2004, the department of Loreto has received $2,405 million Soles as a proportion of the royalties (known as canon petrolero), which represents 38% of the total transferred resources to Loreto.

Loreto’s regional government is obliged to spend 10% of the money they receive on the communities where the oil is produced, and local governments 5%. However, local and regional governments have not always properly managed such funds. Indeed, in 2014 the previous regional president, Iván Vásquez, was charged with embezzling funds that should have gone to the communities of Lot 1AB.

Despite the economic importance of Lot 1AB, it has brought little improvement to social conditions in Loreto. It is still the poorest department in the whole of Peru.

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<th>DISTRICT WITHIN OIL BLOCK 1AB</th>
<th>FINANCIAL POVERTY (%)</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Poverty</td>
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<td>Andoas</td>
<td>89.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Tigre</td>
<td>71.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pastaza</td>
<td>74.1</td>
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<td>Trompeteros</td>
<td>69.4</td>
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Social indicators for Loreto

- Less than half of Loreto's children go to secondary school.

- According to 2013 information from the Ministry of Education, reading comprehension in Loreto is 7.6% and math ability is 1.9%, occupying the last position nationally in both cases.

- The family income per capita is 7 500 soles per month.

- In 2013 only 25% of homes had access to clean, treated water.

- In 2013 only 25% of homes had access to clean, treated water. In Loreto, infant mortality is 33 per 1000 live births (national average is 19), while neonatal mortality is 19 per 1000 live births (national average is 12).
CONCLUSIONS

Since 2014 the price of oil has fallen dramatically worldwide. In early 2015 the price of oil per barrel was only $US50, whereas in 2014 it was around $US118. This noticeable drop has affected Loreto’s entire economy, leading to a reduction in oil production, and to oil companies firing people. Regional and local government are under pressure to secure funds to provide the services that Loreto’s citizens need. As Roger Grandez, a local economist, states: “This is an excellent opportunity for Loreto to start thinking of alternatives to oil and extraction, and start to explore and exploit other, more sustainable proposals for our economy. We can’t continue depending on oil”. A transition is required.

But Loreto, the Amazon and the communities of the Pastaza, Tigre and Corrientes rivers are facing 30 years more of oil exploration and production in an already severely impacted area. The moment has come to make every endeavor to ensure that the experiences and proposals of the local people – the guardians of their territories and of the Amazon – are taken into account.

The indigenous groups are currently presenting their proposals in the so-called prior consultation process. Indigenous people have a right to prior consultation when measures are adopted that can affect their collective rights. ILO Convention 169. The demand is that the proposals such as participation in the benefits, in the monitoring, in the environmental and social assessment tools, transparency mechanisms, financial guarantees for clean-up, compensation and other contingencies, sustainable and intercultural development projects, are included in the contract between Perupetro and the new operator.
References

1. DAR, Loreto Sostenible al 2012, Marc Dourojeanni
2. Pacaya Samiria National Reserve (also on the Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance http://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/documents/library/site%252025%2520june%25202015.pdf)
3. DAR, Loreto Sostenible al 2012, Marc Dourojeanni
5. DAR, Loreto Sostenible al 2012, Marc Dourojeanni
6. Since 1971
7. Oil block IAB spans three river basins – the Tigre, Corrientes, and the Pastaza – and is home to over 100 indigenous communities from at least four different indigenous ethnic groups.
8. The current contract expires on August, 29th 2015.
9. Hereafter we refer to Pluspetrol Norte as Pluspetrol
10. Production water comes with temperatures ranging up to 90° C (194° F), is highly salty, and has a high barium content.
11. See Chapter 5. It was only after years of indigenous protests that the company started to reinject, after polluted production waters.
12. According to OSINERGMIN reports, and independent scientific organizations such as E-Tech International
13. Comisión de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Informe de Representación: Vulernación de derechos fundamentales de los pueblos Amazónicos asentados en las cuencas de los Ríos Pastaza, Tigre, Corrientes, Marañón, p34
14. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 99.8% of the indigenous population in the area had excessively high levels of lead and cadmium in their bodies.
15. Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, ICTA-UB investigations published in June 2014, http://www.solidstico-peru.org/portal/article/el-amazonas-peruano-ha-sido-contaminado-por-pet%ce%b3leo-durante-los%ce%b3-no-393180
18. The organization representing Kichwa communities along the Tigre River, FECONAT (Federación de Comunidades Nativas del Alto Tigre) did not sign the agreement.
24. The company argues that the motivation of the move to the Netherlands was based on the country appearing "to be a suitable jurisdiction not only due to the availability of administrative facilities and infrastructure, but also because it is an important, well reputed and serious financial and business center to administer and control foreign business of international private entities." http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/company_responses/pluspetrol-response-re-somo-report-on-tax-avoidance.pdf
26. It founded the subsidiary company PlusPetrol Norte S.A. to specifically manage all of its operations in Loreto, including oil block IAB.
27. www.corpesa.com.pe
28. Empresas comunales. First one was established in the Achuar Community of Olaya. Now there are over 10 community-run companies.
30. Crudine beginnings: An assessment of China National Petroleum Corporation’s environmental and social performance abroad, Adina Matisoff, Friends of the Earth, February 2012, p7-8
31. Crudine beginnings, p8
32. Crudine beginnings, p4
34. http://www.pluspetrol.net/sustainabilityreport2010.pdf In June 2015 Pluspetrol started a nationally run press campaign highlighting their care for the environment and biodiversity, hand in hand with local communities
36. p8 of Comisión de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Informe de Representación: Vulernación de derechos fundamentales de los pueblos Amazónicos asentados en las cuencas de los Ríos Pastaza, Tigre, Corrientes, Marañón
37. 2007 (Corrientes) and 2009 (other rivers).
38. OSINERGMIN noticed that PLUSPETROL wasn’t complying with the norms to reinject the production waters the correct way in Forest Oil Well “Pozo Forestal 04D”, p16-17 Comisión de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Informe de Representación: Vulernación de derechos fundamentales de los pueblos Amazónicos asentados en las cuencas de los Ríos Pastaza, Tigre, Corrientes, Marañón
40. “PlusPetrol refused to pay them, brought 6 of them to the Court of Justice, and moreover, they started a precautionary measure against the Oefa report that says the company is responsible for the remediation of the 92 identified sites with environmental damages in the oil block that they exploit.” http://ojo-publico.com/29/las-heridas-de-pluspetrol-en-la-amazonia-peruana
41. Plan de Abandono
42. Relaciones Comunitarias
43. Pluspetrol Norte: la Gerencia de Medio Ambiente, Seguridad y Asuntos Comunitarios, see Programa de Responsabilidad Social(2005)
47. Pluspetrol Exposition, Programa de Responsabilidad Social de PlusPetrol Norte
48. Resolución Ministerial 061-2006 established free serfdom or use of territories in oil lot IAB. Expires together with the contract. Indigenous communities claim that the lands including oil installations have to be included in new land titles.
49. See the article published by Solsticio-Peru. http://www.solsticio-peru.org/web/noticias/declaran-nula-resolucion-judicial-que-ordenaba-captura-de-21-comuneros-de-las-cuencas-del-tigre-y-pastaza/
50. Informe del Relator Especial sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas. James Anaya
52. PeruPetro presentation, COMISIÓN DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS CONGRESO DE LA REPÚBLICA LOTE 192 CONSULTA PREVIA Y LICITACIÓN PÚBLICA, Luis E. Ortigas Cúneo, 19 Noviembre 2014
53. “Informe de Ingresos y gastos por canción Petrolero” - Grupo Propietario Ciudadana, January 2015
54. See p13-14, Comisión de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Informe de Representación: Vulernación de derechos fundamentales de los pueblos Amazónicos asentados en las cuencas de los Ríos Pastaza, Tigre, Corrientes, Marañón
55. See also Case number 2506/01550-2014-204-0 against Ivan Vaquez
56. See http://www.inei.gob.pe/
57. People from the Tigre River have opposed the renewal of the licence to Pluspetrol because it has been condemned by the people’s assembly for being an irrespons-ible company, all of this in an exercise of their right to self-determination and administration of community justice. Taking into account the people’s sentence, the company should leave their territory as soon as its contract expires.
Acknowledgement:
All information contained in this report, at first instance, emanate from the affected indigenous federations and their struggle to defend their territories, demand justice and a clean environment. The Chaikuni Institute supports and works closely with two of these indigenous federations: FECONAT and FEDIQUEP.

Special thanks to:
E-Tech International, Earth Rights International, Roger Grande, Amazon Watch, DAR, Wendy Pineda, Solsticio Peru, the people of the Tigre river, Matthew Watherston